THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

RUSSIA AS AN ALLY IN WAR AND PEACE

A Radio Discussion by * REINHOLD NIEBUHR
WALTER DURANTY *and* LOUIS GOTTSCHALK

PROPERTY OF
LIBRARY OF TH
MAR - 1 1943
WOMAN'S COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

469TH BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH
THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY

NUMBER 257 * * FEBRUARY 21, 1943

Around the Round Table . . . .

Reinhold Niebuhr, professor of Christian ethics at Union Theological Seminary, studied at Elmhurst College (Illinois), Eden Theological Seminary (St. Louis), and received his B.D. and M.A. degrees from the Yale University Divinity School. Professor Niebuhr is an ordained minister and served as pastor of a Detroit church from 1915 to 1928, when he went to Union Theological Seminary to teach. He has assumed an active role in civic and national affairs. Professor Niebuhr is the editor of *Christianity and Society* and *Christianity and Crisis*, and he is the author of many books, among which are: *Does Civilization Need Religion?* (1927), *Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic* (1929), *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932), *Reflections on the End of an Era* (1934), *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (1935), *Beyond Tragedy* (1937), *Christianity and Power Politics* (1940), and *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, Volume I (1941).

Walter Duranty, foreign correspondent for the *New York Times*, has spent most of his time since 1921 in this capacity in Russia. He is a native of England and was educated at Cambridge University. He is the author of *I Write as I Please* (1935), *One Life, One Kopeck* (1937), *The Gold Train* (1938), and *The Kremlin and the People* (1940), and is now working on a history of the Soviet Union.

Louis Gottschalk, professor of modern history at the University of Chicago, is especially interested in the field of French history and is an interpreter of French-American relations. He is the author of *Jean Paul Marat: A Study in Radicalism* (1927), which has also appeared in French translation; *The Era of the French Revolution* (1929); *Lafayette Comes to America* (1935); *Lafayette Joins the American Army* (1937); *Lady-in-Waiting: The Romance of Lafayette and Aglaé de Hunolstein* (1939); and *Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution* (1942). Dr. Gottschalk received his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Cornell University and later was associated with the department of history there. He has taught at the University of Illinois and the University of Louisville and since 1925 has been associated with the University of Chicago. At the present time Dr. Gottschalk is also assistant editor of the *Journal of Modern History*.

RUSSIA AS AN ALLY IN WAR AND PEACE

•

MR. GOTTSCHALK: As we all know, the news from the Russian front for the last few months has been magnificent. But, despite universal admiration for the Russians as fighters, there's a great deal of skepticism in certain quarters of the United States about Russia as an ally in war and peace. I was surprised to learn that a recent Gallup poll indicates that 54 per cent of the population of the United States either are doubtful about Russia as an ally or are certain that she is not a dependable one.[1]

What about Russia's dependability from a military point of view?

MR. DURANTY: I think that from a military point of view there is no question any more. I had the privilege of twice talking to Stalin himself, and even in those days—it was quite a long time ago—I was convinced. He said enough then to convince me that Russia's military strength was much greater than was generally supposed abroad. Am I right about that?

MR. NIEBUHR: You are the expert on that question, Mr. Duranty, and I wouldn't challenge it at all. I believe in the Russian power and effectiveness.

---

[1] The Gallup poll released on February 3, 1943, asked the following question: "Do you think Russia can be trusted to cooperate with us when the war is over?" The results were:

	March 1942	Today
Yes	39%	46%
No	39	29
Undecided	22	25

Quite obviously, first of all, the power of Russia is based upon a very ancient and traditional Russian patriotism. Patriotism naturally strengthens any nation when it is invaded. I think that it was significant that Stalin appealed to that patriotism, rather than to communism, at the time when the Nazis invaded Russia. But I wouldn't deny the fact, either, that the Communist Revolution had strengthened Russia—technically certainly and, I think, morally, too. So that as a very potent ally in the war I have no question about Russia at all.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I'm inclined to think with you on those lines. Duranty, I recall that two years ago, on a University of Chicago ROUND TABLE, you were one of the few people that was confident that Russia would last against the attack of Germany.[2] Everybody else was betting on Germany. The question of Russian solidarity and of Russian military ability doesn't seem to be a debatable one now. Nevertheless, there is a certain coldness on the part of the Russians in some quarters toward the United Nations and on the part of the United Nations toward Russia. Don't you think that that is so?

MR. DURANTY: I don't believe so. The word "coldness" is much too strong a word to use. The Russians are perhaps "uncertain" about what our countries are proposing to do in the future, and we perhaps are somewhat doubtful about what they are proposing to do. But I don't think that they feel "cold" toward us. I think that the word is too strong.

MR. NIEBUHR: But, after all, a quarter of a century of ideological

[2] See Walter Duranty, Louis Gottschalk, and Samuel N. Harper, *Soviet Russia at War*, a University of Chicago ROUND TABLE transcript, No. 172, broadcast June 29, 1941.

The University of Chicago ROUND TABLE. *Published weekly. 10 cents a copy; five copies, 25 cents; full-year subscription, 52 issues, two dollars. Published by the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Entered as second-class matter January 3, 1939, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879.*

struggle can't be liquidated very quickly. I should think that we would have to admit that there is still a tremendous heritage of mutual distrust on both sides—I don't know a word that is stronger. That great heritage of mutual distrust will have to be liquidated if we are to be absolutely effective allies—not just in the war but afterward, too. It probably is inevitable that we will hold together in the war, but to be allies in the peace is another matter.

MR. DURANTY: Wouldn't you say "mutual doubt" rather than "mutual distrust"?

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Let me interrupt there. It seems to me that it is something more than doubt. It comes closer to distrust. For example, the fact that the Russians do not permit military and technical observers full freedom in the inside of Russia would seem to indicate this.

MR. DURANTY: Yes, that's quite right from your point of view. But you've got to understand the mentality of the Bolshevist leaders in general and of Stalin himself. They were men who fought against very severe repression in the formative years of their lives. They were arrested. They were under aliases. They were spied upon—*provocateurs*—in and out of prison and exile. You can't expect them to regard these matters as we do. Also, don't forget that in the last war military men were like that. It took us foreign correspondents in France two years to persuade the British and the French authorities to allow permanent missions of foreign correspondent observers at headquarters.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: How about the Casablanca business, then? The fact that Stalin, though invited, did not come and gave an excuse that must appear to a large number of people as a lame one—that he couldn't come because he was busy on the front—would seem to indicate a certain hesitancy on his part, would it not?

MR. DURANTY: Do you call it "lame"? He was busy on the front. He was winning the Battle of Stalingrad, the greatest Ger-

man defeat since Jena[3]—the only time a German field marshal was forced to surrender in battle. Don't you think Stalin had something to do?

MR. NIEBUHR: I don't think, Duranty, that that's the best explanation of Casablanca. He may have been very busy, but he could have sent a lieutenant, of course. The more obvious reason for hesitancy at Casablanca could be explained by a very interesting affirmation that the Japanese made just before the announcement of Casablanca. You may remember that the Japanese took occasion, rather ostentatiously, to reaffirm their neutrality pact with Russia and to declare that they would be loyal to it if the Russians were loyal to it. That seemed to me to be a left-handed notice to the Russians, "Be careful about your foreign policy beyond Europe. Don't get involved in Asia, because you will imperil the position that you hold with us." Now, I think that, considering that the Russians are bearing a very great burden in Europe, it would be too much to expect them to take on the Japanese until such a time as they have to or as they want to. That, I think, is the real explanation of the hesitancy at Casablanca.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: It would seem to me apropos of that Japanese-Russian situation, and also a fact important for the American audience to bear in mind, that that does mean a great burden to the Russians and immobilizes a large part of the Japanese army. Without Russia's being obliged to fight a war on two fronts, she actually is fighting a large number of the Japanese in a sort of passive fashion by keeping them immobilized.

MR. DURANTY: Yes, quite. I think that Niebuhr's right in saying that undoubtedly if Stalin had gone to Casablanca it would have been inevitable that there would have been some discussion of Far Eastern affairs, for which the Russians might have been held re-

[3] On October 14, 1806, just outside the town of Jena, Napoleon won a decisive victory over the Prussian army which was led by the Prince of Hohenlohe.

sponsible by the Japanese and, therefore, perhaps forced to abandon their position of neutrality which they have so carefully maintained.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Then it would seem that we are not altogether out of agreement on the question of a certain amount of "coldness" or, if you don't like the word, a certain lack of cooperation between the Russians and the United Nations. Whatever the explanation may be, it exists.

I should like to raise the question, therefore—because it has been raised by a number of letters sent to the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE—as to what is behind this lack of cooperation. To begin with, one of the questions asked is whether Russia is really interested in fighting for freedom. Do you think that Russia has given up the idea of a Bolshevik world revolution, for example?

MR. NIEBUHR: I wouldn't make too large claims for the Russian freedom—certainly not actually—although it may be something else potentially. It seems to me that the Russian form of government is a dictatorship and that it wouldn't serve any purpose to deny it.

What I think is important, in terms of our more basic alliance with Russia, beyond the military alliance, is that we have something else that brings us close to Russia. That is a common belief in justice—in a general standard of justice—which transcends the interests of any one particular race or nation. It's at that point that we have to exploit our common ground. The Russian dictatorship is based upon the Communist dogma of a dictatorship of the proletariat, which will ultimately wither away with the state itself. I don't take that dogma very seriously. I do take seriously the Russian, even the Communist, desire for justice.

Whether they're going to try to establish this universal justice by world revolution is a question. I would rather imagine that Stalin today places national foreign policy first, and I imagine that Russian Communist policy is subordinate to the Russian national policy.[4]

[4] Stalin in a report to the nation on November 5, 1942, told his people that

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I can't help remembering, though, in that connection that there was a quarrel between two factions of the Bolshevik party—the Trotsky faction and the Stalin faction. Trotsky stood for international revolution. Stalin stood for the revolution within one country. There have been purges, of course, which have wiped out a good many of those who didn't agree with Stalin on that question.

Is it your opinion, Duranty—you've come from there only very recently—that the idea of international revolution has been entirely given up by the Russians?

MR. DURANTY: I wouldn't go so far as to say that. I think that there may occur revolutionary conditions in Europe, perhaps as far as the Pyrenees, perhaps even beyond the Pyrenees. It will depend exactly on how and where the war ends. If our forces are close to the center, then, perhaps, revolutionary movements may be avoided as we bring in food and fuel, clothing, medicine, and so on, which the European countries will need tremendously. But if we're not near to the center, there might be revolutionary movements, and I question whether the Bolsheviks might be able to resist the temptation of following out their own ideological provisions.

MR. NIEBUHR: That would mean, wouldn't it, that they would be inclined to do that not only for the reason that they still had Communist ideas and ideals but also from the standpoint of their own Russian interests of preserving or of guaranteeing their security on the Continent?

MR. DURANTY: Yes, that is, perhaps, the case. But, on the other

---

the program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is "abolition of racial exclusiveness, equality of nations and integrity of their territories, liberation of enslaved nations and restoration of their sovereign rights, the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes, economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material welfare, restoration of democratic liberties, the destruction of the Hitlerite regime. . . . .

"It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany. . . . . It is not our aim to destroy all military force in Germany. . . . . It is inadvisable from the standpoint of the future."

hand, you've got to remember that Russia has an enormous territory. It's greater than the United States, Mexico, Canada, Central America, all put together, with greater and larger natural resources, which it wishes to develop.[5] I question whether the Russians would want any particular revolutionary movement in Europe which might bring them into conflict, after all, with this country or with Great Britain.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Another question that writers to this ROUND TABLE have mentioned goes somewhat like this: Is democracy a shorter step from communism than it is from czarism? In other words, is Russia tending toward democracy? Has she been tending toward democracy in recent years? What is your opinion, Duranty?

MR. DURANTY: I should say "Yes." Mind you, in Russia, they don't have what we consider freedom or democracy. That's understood. On the other hand, I think that the tendency is in that direction. The new constitution, after all, is based on the Constitution of the United States, and I think it will, in the future, guarantee something that we consider democratic.[6] On the other hand, of

---

[5] The U.S.S.R. has an area of 8,819,791 square miles. This may be compared with the United States, which has a total area of 3,026,789 square miles.

[6] The new Soviet constitution, which was adopted December 5, 1936, and which replaced the 1924 constitution, provided for direct, instead of the formerly indirect, election procedure for the choice of delegates to the Soviet congress; proclaimed various social benefits as the right of every Soviet citizen; established a bicameral national legislature with representation in one house based on population, in the other on nationality; recognized "freedom of service of religious cults"; and contained some assurances of civil liberties. The country was divided into Union Republics, each with its separate government for local affairs and patterned on the Union government. There were originally eleven such Union Republics, the most important of which is the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (with nearly two-thirds of the population and more than three-fourths of the area), but since 1936 five more Union Republics have been formed (Lithuanian, Latvian, etc.).

Politically, the new constitution brought little if any change in Soviet practice. Stalin remained a dictator of unlimited powers. Only one political organization, the Communist party, remained legal. Nor was any opposition permitted to manifest itself in speech or writing after the new constitution was declared.

course, Lenin himself said that it would take probably three generations before the Russian people would be capable of self-government in the terms by which we mean self-government.

MR. NIEBUHR: I wouldn't make too large claims for that constitution—not as a political fact. Perhaps as a moral fact that constitution does represent the general belief of the Russian system in democracy as an ultimate aim. However, it hasn't been implemented. As a political fact, it seems to me still to be in the realm of a mere gesture.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Nevertheless, as opposed to the Nazi attitude toward democracy, it is a bow in a friendly fashion toward democracy rather than a thumbing of the nose. That seems to me to indicate that, as far as world revolution is concerned, probably there is going to be less emphasis on that in Russia than there has been in the past and possibly, with regard to democracy, there is going to be more.

That raises another question—the question of whether it is the foreign policy of Russia which can explain this feeling of skepticism on the part of the American people toward Russia. On that foreign policy, Duranty, do you feel that the American people are justified in being suspicious?

MR. DURANTY: I don't think so. Russia will want and does want to cooperate with this country and with the United Nations not only in waging war but in making peace.

MR. NIEBUHR: Isn't it a little bit more complex than that? Isn't it a fact that in every nation there is a natural desire for security and perhaps two impulses about that security? On the one hand, you would like to gain it in terms of your own power and in terms of your own arrangements by dominating contiguous territory which is strategically important, and so forth. On the other hand, you've probably got a wiser notion about gaining it mutually. I have an idea that the Russians are probably of two minds on this subject, just as we are, and that perhaps the course of world history will determine which of these two impulses will be dominant.

[*Discussion continued on page 9*]

An Economic Atlas

of the Western Section of

The Soviet Union

On the following pages are detailed maps of the economic features of the western areas of the Soviet Union. The data are taken from the *Great Soviet World Atlas** and provide a basis for an analysis of the economic assets that were won by Germany in its big drive into Russia in 1941 and which are being bitterly fought over today as Russia marches westward, regaining day by day the economic prizes that are shown on these maps. The reader who follows the progress of the Russian army will be able to determine Russian economic gains as the Russian armies move closer and closer to the 1939 boundaries of the U.S.S.R. (beginning of shaded areas).

The student of economics will find here measurable data on the economic activities of this region. Most of the statistical information is for the year 1935. Since that time, and before German occupation, certain new plants were constructed, and output in most instances was increased. It should be noted, however, that few new plants were erected in the area covered by this study, because of the decentralized efforts of the Soviet planners. Just how much of these factories and facilities for the utilization of resources has been destroyed or is being destroyed by the retreating German army cannot be ascertained. Nevertheless, the economic importance of this area is obvious.

---

* *Bolshoi Sovietskii Atlas Mira* (Moscow, 1937). Scale of maps: 1 inch equals 250 miles.

Location of Heavy Industries



All heavy industries with more than 300,000 rubles' (about $60,000) production in 1935 are shown on this map. Light industry, not shown (textiles, glass, etc.), is concentrated in the Moscow area.

Metal and Chemical Production



A thousand miles east of Moscow and 1,500 miles northeast of Krivoi Rog is the great Ural storehouse of iron, coal, oil, chemicals, and nonferrous metals. On this map enterprises with less than 100,000 rubles' production are not shown.

Location of Food Industries



European Russia was heavily dependent upon Ukrainian agriculture, but increasing emphasis had also been laid upon developing the food industries farther east. Volume of production is not indicated on this map, and only industries of more than 300,000 rubles' output are shown.

Sources and Volume of Electric Power



Electricity is essential to industry and a first objective of bombing raids. Dneprostroi was the largest power source of the southern industrial area (more than 500,000 kilowatts) but has now been partially destroyed and is not in use. Stations of less than 6,000 kilowatts' power are not shown on this map.

Location of Fuel Industries



All coal-producing areas in European Russia are shown on this map. Not shown are the rich Baku and Groznyi oil fields of the Caucasus and the Ural, Buriev, and Karaganda coal fields. Peat, an important fuel, is found only in the European sections of Russia. Enterprises of less than 100,000 rubles' production are not shown.

Mr. Gottschalk: This imperialism of Russia is certainly not anything new. We know that the Russians have been very much interested in the Balkans from time immemorial. The Baltic situation is also a very ticklish one, and so is the Far Eastern one. It doesn't seem to me proper to dismiss the imperialism of Russia without probing into the possibility that it may again create difficulties.

Mr. Duranty: I don't know. You were speaking about the Baltic. I spent a lot of time in Riga. I was there, as a matter of fact, in 1919 and 1920, in that winter when the Letts were fighting the Reds. Incidentally, General Alexander, who is now commanding in Egypt and who is a personal friend of mine (was at school with me, as it happens), was leading a German Baltic group—they called it a "division," but it was really only about twenty-five hundred men—who were fighting against the Reds.[7] The Letts themselves, no doubt, would prefer to be completely independent. But the question arises whether such independence is possible any more.

I don't think that the Russians will be anxious about Latvia or the Baltic States. Once the war is won, they'll have no fear of Germany as they had before. On the other hand, they feel—and the *Pravda* has recently stated—that they regard the Baltic States, and, for that matter, Bessarabia, as an integral part of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Gottschalk: It seems to me that there's a greater danger there. If the Russians are going to insist upon the Baltic as an absolute minimum of their demands, then we're placed in a position where we may say to certain small nations, "You are not entitled to sovereignty because one of our big allies wants to have your territory. Integrity is good only for those nations that our allies are not anxious to annex." Whereas American public opinion, I'm quite sure, is going to take the attitude that, regardless of who wants which small nation, small nations are entitled to self-determination.

---

[7] This fighting occurred over the question of the Polish, Russian, and Lithuanian frontier after the last war and especially over the city and province of Vilna.

I don't see any possibility of collaboration after the war if the Russians are going to insist that they must at least have the countries of Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia.

MR. NIEBUHR: I agree that this is a hazard to mutual and intimate relations between ourselves and Russia after the war. But I'm inclined to agree with Duranty that this is a very fixed part of Russian foreign policy. I don't say that they're right or wrong in it, but they have been very emphatic both in what they have said and in what they haven't said in regard to these Baltic States particularly. They do regard them as part of their territory. I'm afraid that, whatever schemes of mutual relations we'll have to work out, we'll have to begin with that and that it will be very difficult to deflect the Russians from that particular purpose.

MR. DURANTY: I think that that's a probable assumption, Niebuhr, and that you're right on that. Mind you, I don't say Finland, and I don't say Poland, but I think that we must assume that the Russians will want to start from the premise that the Baltic States are part of the Soviet Union. It's quite probable that they will give them a greater measure of autonomy than in the past. The thing can, I think, be arranged.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I disagree, Duranty. It seems to me that the Russians are much more anxious for international cooperation than you seem to think and that they are much more willing to make concessions. I'm inclined to believe that if we made a concession which would guarantee them safety from attack from Europe, or which would indicate to them the likelihood that such an attack would be handled by international cooperation before it developed into a military movement, that they would be perfectly willing to grant integrity to those states.

Remember that Russia has a long history of cooperation for collective security. On Spain, on Czechoslovakia, and on Austria, Russia's record is a lot better than that of England or France or even the United States.

Mr. Niebuhr: I think that you're right about that. We have to remember their record in favor of collective security. At the same time, I think that you go a little too far in setting the one type of security against the other, saying either they're going to have it on their own terms or they're going to have it mutually. The actual situation is that every one of the nations will try to have an anchor to the leeward, whether rightly or wrongly. They'll go in on the scheme of mutual security—at least, let us hope they will—but they'll also want something of a more intimate and immediate protection. It's that which I think determines the Russian policy in regard to the Baltic. It would be better if they could yield on that point, but I'm afraid that they're not going to yield.

Mr. Duranty: I don't think that they're going to yield, but I don't think that it matters so much. The essential factor, as Gottschalk said, is that the Russians do want to cooperate with us, not merely in war, as they're doing today, but also in the peace.

Mr. Gottschalk: That cooperation in peace leads to a very delicate economic problem. It is a fact that a great many of the important industries and banking houses and other commercial organizations have been liquidated in the occupied countries. The Russians are not going to want a complete restoration there, are they? They're not going to adopt an attitude of laissez faire, are they?

Mr. Niebuhr: That's right, Gottschalk. Besides the power and political questions—geographic and otherwise—we do face the economic problem. The continent of Europe is going to be impoverished. It seems to me that the greatest hazard to a general scheme of mutual cooperation and security with Russia will lie in the tendency, which I'm afraid is a very deep tendency among so-called "democratic nations," to try to prevent communism on the Continent. What's very paradoxical about this policy, as it seems to be forming already and as it's bound to form, is that we'll probably support fascism in order to avoid communism. Not only that,

but we won't avoid communism, because I think that if the impoverished people of Europe are faced with a choice between very retrogressive Fascist movements and communism, we're going to throw the whole of the Continent into the hands of Russia in the very effort to avoid it.

MR. DURANTY: I don't agree with that. I said before, and I still think, that there is no danger of that.

Incidentally, it's worth remembering that there is no such thing as communism in Russia today. The regime in Russia is socialism. I would go almost further and call it "state capitalism."[8]

We may have anarchy in Europe. We may have all sorts of dreadful Red and Black movements, of which I am afraid. But my impression and my belief is that the Russians will not foster or push such movements. On the contrary, they would rather tend to stem them.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Apropos of that, a quotation from a recent statement of Litvinov's is probably entirely pat. This statement reads: "As a result of the war Russian communism will be modified, American democracy will be modified, British capitalism will be modified. The things that have stood between them will be broken down. The changes in them will bring them closer together." I think that that supports the point of view that I've been making—the Russians will make concessions if they feel that concessions on the other side—guaranteeing them a certain amount of safety—will also be made.

MR. NIEBUHR: I wouldn't deny that they will make concessions. In fact, that's where the hope lies. They've already proved that

[8] *Communism* is a system of social and economic organization in which property is owned by the state or group, to be shared in common or to be distributed among members of the community equally or in proportion to their respective needs. *Socialism* is a political and economic system of social organization based on collective or governmental ownership and democratic management of the essential means for the production and distribution of goods—a system whereby private ownership of land and "productive capital" becomes public ownership. *State capitalism* is a system of capitalism in which capital is largely controlled or owned by the state.

they're ready to do that—have proved it in the past. At the same time I don't think that we ought to minimize the difficulties.

Take Yugoslavia, for instance. The present situation in Yugoslavia seems to me to prove that the Russians are not completely indifferent to what is happening in Europe and in various nations in Europe, perhaps particularly in the Slav nations of Europe. They're supporting one group in Yugoslavia.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That's rather a befuddled situation in the Balkans there. Duranty, do you have any information on that?

MR. DURANTY: I know Bulgaria, and I know Yugoslavia pretty well. When I was in Bulgaria in the late fall of 1940, a Russian football team came there. They were cheered throughout the city, and they were encouraged to make speeches and this and that. I said to the Bulgarians, "But you're, after all, a people of small farmers, what in Russia they would call 'kulaks.' You don't have a big industrial movement."

They said, "We're not thinking about the Russians as Bolsheviks. We're thinking about the Russians as Russians. We have regard for them, after all. You see the statue of the Czar Liberator, and you see the street is called the 'Street of the Czar Liberator.' We regard the Russians as friends."

I think that the Russians themselves do feel that they have a certain friendship—kinship, if you like—with the Slavic peoples of southern Europe.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Yes, but nevertheless in Yugoslavia there are two parties.

MR. DURANTY: Definitely.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: There is a Partisan party, which apparently is supported by the Communists. There is a Mahailovitch party, which is apparently supported by the Yugoslav government-in-exile and by England. The Yugoslavs may feel friendly to the Russians, but which Yugoslavs?

Mr. Duranty: There is a somewhat similar situation in China, where you have, also, the sort of left wing which corresponds to the Partisans—the so-called "Communists" in China—and you have the other, the central government of China, which in a sense might be regarded as corresponding to the government-in-exile of Yugoslavia.

Mr. Niebuhr: Does not your admission in regard to this rather disprove your earlier contention that the Russians had no particular interest in furthering any of these causes? They might be thrown in their lap, but they wouldn't do anything about them. They're still maintaining pretty active political units in the various parts of the world, both East and West—not only in Asia but also in Europe.

Mr. Duranty: It does seem as if that were the case, but, on the other hand, I don't think that they're doing it with any deliberate intent or with any real wish to interfere. I think that they feel that these Slavic countries are, in a sense, under their tutelage and that they want to encourage and protect them.

Mr. Gottschalk: The thing that I'm afraid of is that a great number of people in this country, to quote William Henry Chamberlin,[9] are inclined to think of Stalin as a supernationalist, as a sort of "Russia First Committee" that has never dissolved. You keep saying, Duranty, that they have interest in Yugoslavia and in the Baltic. You recently wrote an article saying they had interest in China. Yet you say they are willing to cooperate. I too think that they are willing to cooperate, but only if they get equal compensations; and definitely we'll have to make concessions in that regard. You don't seem to think they will make concessions.

Mr. Duranty: They might be willing to make concessions. Of course, I don't always agree with William Henry Chamberlin. But,

[9] William Henry Chamberlin for a number of years was foreign correspondent in Moscow for the *Christian Science Monitor*.

on the other hand, I don't see why they shouldn't make concessions. It's a matter of give-and-take.

MR. NIEBUHR: Isn't the situation something like this: We can't determine Russian policy. If there are very strong policies toward isolationism in Russia, we couldn't very completely prevent that. But, on the other hand, the Russians are as we are in this respect. A good part of their tendency toward a mutual relationship will depend upon our tendency toward a mutual relationship, and if we can restrain and discipline our own mistrust, thereby lies the most effective way of establishing a system of mutual security with the Russians.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That raises the very vital question, that you mentioned before, of our policy of no revolution—the policy of our State Department against revolution and in favor of moderate groups. It seems to me that you hit a very important nail on a very important head in that connection.

MR. NIEBUHR: What seems to me to be important there is that democracy—our democracy, the Anglo-Saxon democracy—has to be imaginative enough not to try to press itself upon the Continent, because our democracy rests upon an economic system which has tremendous economic margins which the Continent doesn't have. If we try to make the Continent in our image, we'll make it into a Fascist image. That seems to me to be the horrible possibility of the present situation.

MR. DURANTY: I hope that that's not true, but one thing that you've got to remember—we've all got to remember—is that revolutions aren't made. Revolutions occur as a result of certain circumstances and certain conditions. Those circumstances and conditions may be present in Europe.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: We have disagreed most pointedly regarding the degree of willingness on the part of both the Russian and the American governments to make concessions to each other.

On the other hand, we have agreed that without closer cooperation between them, even though the war may be won, the prospects of international organization for peace after the war are greatly diminished. Americans and Russians alike have to choose between the road that leads to mutual concessions and world order and that which leads to national advantage and a new imbalance of power. We have to choose between mutual suspicion of and meddling with each other's internal policies and acceptance of political and economic differences as an unavoidable feature of any international order.

In the game of diplomatic concessions after the war, Russia will play well and realistically on our side if she thinks she can—against us if she feels she must. We agree that she will not yield an inch unless we, too, prove willing to yield.

You, gentlemen, are somewhat less optimistic than I that mutual concessions will be found possible, but all three of us certainly hope that they will be made.

The ROUND TABLE, *oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company. The supplementary information in this transcript has been developed by staff research and is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the* ROUND TABLE *speakers.*

What Do *You* Think?

1. How great is American skepticism about Russia as an ally in war and peace? What have been and are the principal obstacles to Soviet-American friendship? Do you agree that there is a tremendous heritage of mutual distrust on both sides? What is the present state of United States–Soviet relations?

2. Do you think that Americans have been oversold or undersold on Russia? Do Americans have a picture of Russia that makes sense? What are the sources of strength that have enabled the Russians to offer such steadfast resistance to the German military machine?

3. What has the Russian Revolution, which celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary November 7, 1942, achieved in terms of living standards for its people? In military strength? In political institutions?

4. What is the Third International? Do you think that Russia has given up the ideal of a Bolshevik world revolution? Is an American foreign policy to prevent revolutions in the defeated countries an anti-Russian policy? Should Russia renounce the Third International before being accepted into any world organization after the war?

5. What is the Soviet economic system? How has it contributed to their military strength? Is it a system that can be readily adopted as a result of revolutionary conditions in Europe? Why?

6. What about Russia as an ally in the peace? Do you think Russia would participate with the United States and the United Nations in planning and carrying through post-war reconstruction? Or do you think it may be more to the interest of Russia to assure peace and security only to those countries which have by that time adopted an economic and social system similar to that of Soviet Russia? Does Russia have interests and objectives in the Far East that conflict with American interest there?

More on This Topic

CHAMBERLIN, WILLIAM HENRY, "Russian Enigma," *Harper's*, August, 1942. *Says Russian military strength is based on Russian nationalism.*

DALLIN, DAVID J., *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939–42.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942. *Contends that Russia's policy has been to be a "third power," outside and apart from two contending coalitions.*

DEAN, VERA M., *Russia at War.* New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1942. *Answers twenty key questions about Russia.*

GRAEBNER, WALTER, "Moscow Today," *Life*, January 11, 1943. *Describes life in wartime Russia.*

HARPER, SAMUEL N. *The Government of the Soviet Union.* New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1937. *An authoritative study of Soviet government.*

LERNER, MAX, "Russia and the Future," *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1942. *Analyzes the problem of United States–Soviet cooperation.*

NIEBUHR, REINHOLD, "Russia and the West," *Nation*, January 16 and 23, 1943. *Argues that Russia may have to discard the Third International to become acceptable to the West.*

SCOTT, JOHN, *Behind the Urals.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1942.

———, "Stalin's Ural Stronghold," *Reader's Digest*, February, 1942. *Describes progress in industrialization of Siberian areas.*

WALLACE, HENRY A., "Our Friendship to Russia," *Vital Speeches*, November 15, 1942. *Says Russia has achieved much ethnic, educational, and economic democracy and is on the way to achieving political democracy.*

WILLIAMS, ALBERT RHYS, "The Soviets and America," *Free World*, January, 1943. *States reasons for belief that Russia and America will cooperate in the peace.*

The People Say . . . .

The following letters are representative of the views expressed by the ROUND TABLE *audience on "Germany: Its Education and Re-education," broadcast February 14, 1943.*

*

Need To Eat, Too

. . . . May I state that I enjoyed your last Sunday's discourse and agree with your remarks concerning Germany's re-education. It seems to me that education to prove effective must be combined with a full stomach. We must not repeat the same mistake that was made after the last war. We expected democracy to flourish in Germany against a poverty-stricken people, and this was an impossibility. . . . .—*A listener from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.*

*

Who Are *We* To Tell Them?

My reaction was—"These men are *Fascists* who speak in English." There is little difference between what *we* are going to do with them and what we were told *they* were going to do with us. The only difference was *we* and *they*. The principle of racial superiority is still there, along with dominance. *We* will tell them what they shall learn. *We* will enforce our ideas. *We* are the chosen people.

Are these, then, the ideas of intelligent professors in a *democracy?* Apostles of Four Freedoms? Men who influence our children? What is the date set for the next war?—*A listener from Chicago, Illinois*

*

Germany Is Re-educating Us, Too

While we are pondering the "re-education of Germany," Germany is doing rather a thorough job of re-educating us. We are making the same changes in our schools that Germany did in her schools. We are adopting the German way of life because it is necessary to do so in order to compete with Germany. We have adopted militarism along with a system of education that militarism renders necessary. Our central government is increasing in power enormously so that it now controls the lives of all individuals. . . . . What Hitler said about democracy is true; where we fooled him is that we are not a democracy.—*A listener from Chicago, Illinois*

*

Re-education Valueless

. . . . Re-education of the German people, if attempted after the war, will be valueless, because it cannot be made to stick. I know the German people. I graduated from the Univer-

sity of Heidelberg. . . . . It is my considered opinion that democracy in Germany will never work. The German people will never be able to rule themselves. As Sigrid Undset wrote: "The German people are best satisfied, if they feel the heel on their necks. Provided there is someone else that they can kick."—*A listener from Chicago, Illinois*

*

Need for Liberty

It seems to me that the participants yesterday over the air, debating as to whether Germans could ever be taught democracy, omitted a fundamental reason why probably they can be taught, a reason which is found in human nature itself. I refer to the inherent need in man for liberty. Even though a people may not have had liberty, or at least political liberty, once they have had it, they find they cannot do without it.

This fundamental need of the human soul for freedom is, it seems to me, the factor to work on after the war, after, that is, guilty Germans are punished, and the others are made physically comfortable with food, clothing, warmth, and general rehabilitation.

Give these people a taste of political freedom, through whomever they shall appoint to guide them, allow all individuals to have a say as to what they shall have in their land, teach them Hooten instead of *Hootin'* at other races, and they will want nothing else but liberty after a while.

Some of the most loyal citizens in this country are of German extraction. Recent refugees from German tyranny get a breath of freedom here, and find that they never want to do without it again. . . . .—*A listener from Belmont, Massachusetts*

*

Need To "Prepare" Germany for Re-education

. . . . The most important point, to my mind, which should have been discussed and which I hope will be incorporated in any suggestions that you might make to the proper authorities, is the "preparing" of the German mind for the many fine suggestions made on the program. This "preparing" should be to prove definitely to the German people of the fallacy and many lies of the Nazi and Fascist system, by giving them facts of certain and many incidents that have occurred during the past few years of which they would be familiar. This will make them entirely "disillusioned" with the present system and will open their minds for any reasonable program. . . . .—*A listener from Detroit, Michigan*

*

Needed War To Help Youth

In today's discussion it was pointed out that fascism (Naziism) had given the German youth something to live for. It is only fair to point out that this solution as can be seen now was worse than useless, for it is inherent in Naziism that the remedy it used to end unsatisfactory economic conditions and starvation would end in worse economic conditions and more general starvation, that it had to have perpetual war to work at all, and without war it would still end the same.—*A listener from Springfield, Illinois*

TRANSCRIPT SUBSCRIPTIONS

ONE YEAR'S SUBSCRIPTION.....$2.00 SIX MONTHS'.....$1.00

FOR SINGLE COPIES OF THE BROADCASTS LISTED BELOW SEND TEN CENTS IN COIN TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. THIS WEEK'S AND ANY PAST FOUR BROADCASTS .... 25 CENTS.

LISTS

of 1938-40 Transcripts Still in Print Will Be Sent upon Request. Students and Teachers Will Find These Issues To Be Valuable Commentaries upon Events of the Period.

No.

1941

156. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*
161. *War Aims and Peace Aims*
169. *War against the Middle Classes?*
173. *Our Liberties*
185. *New Frontiers in Education*
186. *Anti-Semitism*
189. *Showdown with Japan?*
192. *The Philippines*
193. *Little Business: What Now?*
195. *Canada: Neighbor at War*
198. *What Does Rationing Mean?*

1942

199. *Morale: Ours and Theirs*
201. *Censorship*
203. *Are We Overconfident?*
204. *Labor Policies in Wartime*
207. *Propaganda: Good and Bad*
208. *Civilian Defense*
210. *Women, Work, and the War*
211. *The American Temper*
212. *India*
214. *War Profits*
215. *War and the Family*
218. *Radio in Wartime*
220. *Limiting Wartime Incomes*
221. *Education for Freedom*
222. *The United Nations*
223. *China*
224. *The Near East*
225. *Congress Investigates*
226. *Crisis in Shipping*
227. *Must We Hate Our Enemies?*
228. *War Comes to the Farm*
229. *Should We Discuss the Next Peace Now?*

No.

230. *Political Reconstruction of the Post-war World*
231. *Economic Requisites of a Durable Peace*
232. *Challenge of the Four Freedoms*
233. *Health in Wartime*
234. *Wage Policy in Wartime*
235. *The Rubber Crisis*
236. *Farm Parity*
237. *Congress and the War*
238. *Your Taxes*
239. *The Rediscovery of America*
240. *The Press*
241. *Manpower*
242. *The New Congress*
243. *France*
244. *Crisis Administration*
245. *The Challenge to Local Government*
246. *After One Year of War—What Have We Learned?*
247. *Italy*
248. *Social Security: Challenge to Democracy*
249. *Woodrow Wilson: Prophet or Visionary*

1943

250. *Things To Come: How Science May Shape the Next Twenty-five Years*
251. *1943—Challenge to the Republican Party*
252. *Are We Well Informed?*
253. *Behind the Labor Crisis*
254. *American Foreign Policy: Principle versus Expediency*
255. *The Farmer and Victory*
256. *Germany: Its Education and Re-education.* February 14

Any Round Table Transcript May Be Purchased in Lots of 100 or More at Special Rates upon Request

These are the NBC network stations that carry the ROUND TABLE at the new time

2:00 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Martinsville, Va.	WMVA	1450
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Bluefield, W.Va.	WHIS	1440	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Boston, Mass.	WBZ	1030	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charleston, W.Va.	WGKV	1490	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cincinnati, Ohio	WLW	700	Reading, Pa.	WEEU	850
Clarksburg, W.Va.	WBLK	1400	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Mass.	WBZA	1030
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Syracuse, N.Y.	WSYR	570
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Greenwood, S.C.	WCRS	1450	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	740
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Williamsport, Pa.	WRAK	1400
Harrisburg, Pa.	WKBO	1230	Wilmington, Del.	WDEL	1150
Lakeland, Fla	WLAK	1340	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240	York, Pa.	WORK	1350

1:00 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME

Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Dallas, Texas	WFAA	820	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Des Moines, Iowa	WHO	1040	Mobile, Ala.	WALA	1410
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Montgomery, Ala.	WSFA	1440
			Nashville, Tenn.	WSM	650
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
El Paso, Texas	KSTM	1380	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WOWO	1190	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Hibbing, Minn.	WMFG	1240	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Houston, Texas	KPRC	950	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Virginia, Minn.	WHLB	1400
La Crosse, Wis.	WKBH	1410	Wichita, Kan.	KANS	1240

12:00 M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Safford, Ariz.	KGLU	1450
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240	Yuma, Ariz.	KYUM	1240

11:00 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME

Bakersfield, Cal.	KERN	1410	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590

STATIONS CARRYING ROUND TABLE BY TRANSCRIPTION

Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230			
Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810

Be an informed American!

Keep abreast of the times.

Read the ROUND TABLE *discussions.*

Subscribe to the ROUND TABLE *transcript!*

I would like to receive the ROUND TABLE transcript regularly. Please enter my name on the subscription list—

☐ for six months at $1.00

☐ for one year at $2.00

Name.....

Address.....

City..... State.....

☐ I am enclosing the correct amount

☐ Please send me a bill

A University of Chicago Round Table Broadcast

FEBRUARY 28, 1943

The Airplane and Tomorrow's World

•

SUGGESTED READINGS

"Globalony," *Time*, February 22, 1943.

SIKORSKI, IGOR, "The Coming Air Age," *Atlantic*, September, 1942.

"Technocracy and Postwar," Supplement to *Fortune*, December, 1942.

WALLACE, H. A., "What We Will Get Out of the War," *American*, March, 1943.

PRINTED IN U.S.A.